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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------000--------
RONALD p, STUBB.5, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
vs. 
LYMAN W. HEMMERT, 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by appellant on a note foreclosing 
a mortgage securing same and counterclaim by respondent 
for breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff was granted judgment and foreclosure in the 
amount of $810.00 on unpaid note and $150.00 attorney fee 
minus setoff of $62.04 for utility bill and $200.00 damage 
for breach of contract to supply cooling equipment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks striking of $200.00 damage and interest 
awarded defendant and increase of attorney fees awarded in 
lower court and additional attorney fees for appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 3, 1971, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into an agreement whereby plaintiff would buy defendant's 
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home in Provo, Utah and transfer to defendant all of plain-
tiff's interest in a store in Santaquin, Utah which plaintiff 
had run as a grocery store until December 31, 1970 (T27), 
Plaintiff was allowed a sales price of $13,000,00 for said 
store (T7112), $8,700.00 of which was applied as a down pay-
ment on the purchase of defendant's home and the balance of 
$4,300.00 was reduced to a note (Exhibit "A" of Complaint, 
RlOO; pre-trial order, R44). 
The original earnest money receipt and exchange agree-
ment provided that two walk-in coolers and their cooling 
equipment were to be part of the exchange and sale (Dl). 
Plaintiff executed a Warranty Deed in favor of defendant 
to the store on February 18, 1971, and defendant and his now 
deceased wife gave plaintiff a mortgage on said store dated 
February 20, 1971, to secure plaintiff's $4,300.00 note from 
defendant (Exhibits "A" and "B" of Complaint, RlOO). Both 
the Warranty Deed and mortgage were recorded in the office of 
the Utah County Recorder on February 23, 1971. 
At the time the store exchange was made, the parties 
agreed that plaintiff could leave the display cases and 
other personal property of the grocery store business in the 
store building and the parties would attempt to sell the per-
sonal property and realty together (T812-9; 1515-15; 3311-5). 
When this proved fruitless, plaintiff sold $3,200.00 of the 
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personal property inventory to Burt Durrant (T32J 37a22-30; 38) 0 
Mr. Durrant removed two compressors from the walk-in 
coolers when he was removing the rest of the equipment 
purchased by him (T34114-30). 
Defendant was very anxious to sell the store (Tl5a5-10) 
but no offers were received from anyone desiring to buy the 
building to operate as a grocery store or otherwise use the 
walk-in coolers (Tl6124-30). Then defendant sold the build-
ing to Milo .Jmssen for $7,500.00 on August l, 1973 (T9a30• 
23-25; D4). 
About July 30, 1974 plaintiff began contacting defendant 
about delinquent payments on the mortgage and note (T36al-2), 
after which defendant sent plaintiff a memo dated August 19, 
1974, complaining about the two compressors (D2). Plaintiff 
responded and requested payments on the delinquent note (D2). 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff enlisted the services of 
his counsel to collect the note and foreclose the mortgage 
(T36113-15). 
Numerous contacts were made to get the note paid includ-
ing efforts on the part of plaintiff to contact Durrant, 
obtain the return of the compressors by Durrant to Stubbs, 
and attempt to return said compressors to the store in 
Santaquin but defendant rejected said compressors and was 
uncooperative (Tl0al7; 29; 36; 28; 39J 21•51-55). Plaintiff's 
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attorneys have since performed considerable services for 
plaintiff in foreclosing plaintiff•s mortgage (T52-58; Rl-106), 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ADMITTING 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT INTO 
EVIDENCE WHEN SAME HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED AND MERGED BY 
EXECUTION AND DELIVERY OF THE WARRANTY DEED TO BUYERS 
DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1971. 
The general doctrine of merger is recognized by our 
court as follows1 
It has become elementary that, in the absence 
of fraud, all the conditions and provisions 
contained in an antecedent executory contract 
or agreement are merged in the deed which is 
executed and delivered in fulfillment of the 
stipulations contained in said agreement. In 
the case of Siocum v. Bracy, 55 Minn. 22, 56 
N. w. 826, 43 Am. St. Rep. 499, Mr. Justice 
Mitchell states the rule clearly thus1 
'No rule of law is better settled than that, 
where a deed has been executed and accepted 
as performance of an executory contract to 
convey real estate, the contract is functus 
officio, and the rights of the parties rest 
thereafter solely on the deed. This is so 
although the deed thus accepted varies from 
that stipulated for in the contract, as where 
the vendee accepts the deed of a third party 
in lieu of the deed of his vendor; and as, in 
the sales of land, the law remits the party 
to his covenants in his deed, if there by no 
ingredient of fraud or mistake in the case, 
and the party has not taken the precaution to 
secure himself by covenants, he has no remedy 
for his money, even on failure of title.• 
Reese Howell Coo vs. Brown, 48 U 142, 158 P 
684 (Utah 1916) 
In the absence of fraud or mistake, merger is only 
avoided where it is clearly shown the parties intended to 
avoid merger or where the provisions were clearly collateral. 
38 ALR2d 1311, Secs. 2 and 16. And a collateral agreement 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is often designed to take effect after the execution of the 
deed such as a covenant to make improvements or repairs. 38 
ALR2d 1311 1 Sec. 2. 
Our court of 1966 held an earnest money receipt merged 
in a deed of conveyance which was poorly drawn providing for 
ultimate conveyance to be made in the name of "to be arranged" 
and also providing that same would be abrogated by execution 
of the final deed. Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 U2d 226,419 P2d 199 
(Utah 1966). In the Kelsey case the earnest money receipt 
had obligated the buyers to furnish certain draperies. Our 
court indicated further in Kelsey that such a situation was 
not convincing to them as being a collateral agreement and 
that only equity, fraud, mistake, and the like could have 
made them rule otherwise but no such equities were pleaded. 
Our case is essentially the same type of situation. An 
earnest money agreement was entered into by the parties (Dl) 
on February 3, 1971 providing for transfer of the grocery 
store in Santaquin to defendant for a credit of $8,700.00 
on plaintiff's purchase of defendant's home in Provo. Consum-
mating the exchange, a Warranty Deed dated February 18, 1971 
(P7) conveying the grocery store to defendant and defendant's 
wife was delivered and recorded in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder on February 23, 1971. Said facts were admit-
ted in the court's pre-trial order (R44) and in testimony by 
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defendant (T31). An examination of the earnest money receipt 
shows no intent on the parties that the plaintiff would be 
obligated to make sure the walk-in coolers were attached 
to the building for an indefinite period of time nor can the 
statement on lines 69 through 72 of said agreement stating 
"the two walk-in coolers with their cooling equipment are to 
be left in tact with the building" be considered a collateral 
covenant. 
The statement that the walk-in coolers were to remain 
with the building is dependent upon the obligation to convey. 
On February 18, 1971, the property was conveyed. From that 
point in time plaintiff had fulfilled his obligations under 
the earnest money agreement. 
From that point on any obligation remaining to defen-
dant by plaintiff to protect the coolers and equipment was 
in the form of a duty recognizable in tort and recovery on 
the principles of negligence or unlawful conversion against 
plaintiff would be necessary. 
Moreover defendant had a duty to make sure he was get-
ting what he contracted for. The principle of caveat emptor 
also applies. It has been stated• 
The doctrine of caveat emptor applies in instances 
where there is inspection or investigation of 
premises by purchaser prior to execution of con-
tract for purchase. McDaniel v. Quinn, 307 P2d 
127 (Okla. 1957), 
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And the doctrine also applies to the purchase of real 
property except as otherwise provided by statuteo Mosley v. 
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 NM 236, 114 P2d 740 (N.M. 1941). 
It is incumbent upon the purchaser to examine the property 
prior to taking possession. Mro Hemmert indicated he had 
inspected the premises after signing the earnest money agree-
ment (TlS). 
There was no intent shown that the parties intended a 
provision regarding walk-in coolers and their equipment not 
to merge nor is there any collateral covenant which would 
abrogate the doctrine of merger in this case. The earnest 
money agreement was improperly admitted into evidence over 
plaintiff's objection (T4118-27), (The record should read 
"extinguished" in place of "distinguished" and "recording" 
instead of "reporting" on lines 19 and 20 of T4.) 
-8-
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POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED SUBSTANTIAL ERROR BY AWARDING DEFENDANT 
AN OFFSET OF $200.00 TOGETHER WITH INTEREST FROM DATE OF 
REMOVAL AS REDUCTION IN VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY NOT BASED 
UPON COMPETENT PROOF OF WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY TO 
ESTABLISH SAID REDUCTION IN MARKET VALUE. 
The trial court's pre-trial order (R44) set forth the 
issue of defendant's damage on his counterclaim, if any, 
to be1 
Whether or not the value of the mortgaged pro-
perty set forth above was reduced by removal of 
two air compressors from the building on said 
premises, whether said removal was wrongfully 
done by plaintiff, and if so, the amount in 
which the market value of said property was 
reduced by said wrongful removal. 
Arrldefendant's counsel indicated this was his understanding 
of the issue before the court (T64al2; T80a2). 
The issue before the court was whether the market value 
of the real property mortgaged had been reduced by the improper 
removal of two compressors by plaintiff. Our court has defined 
"market value" to meana 
'Market value' is the price which property will 
bring when offered for sale by one desiring, but 
not compelled, to sell, and bought by one desir-
ing, but not compelled, to purchase. Southern 
Pacific co. vs. Arthur, 10 U2d 306, 352 P2d 693 (Utah 1960) 
31A CJS Evidence, Sec. 181, note 72. 
In an action for a breach of contract ~n sale of realty, 
our court has set down the following rules 
The proper measure of damages would be the dif-
ference between the defendant's offer and the 
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actual market value of the property 9 but the market 
value should be properly established. • • • Andrea-
sen v. Hansen, 8 U2d 370, 335 P2d 404 (Utah 1959) 0 
The above rule was restated by our jurisidiction in 1972 
as follows1 
The measure of damages where the vendor has breached 
a land sale contract is the market value of the 
property at the time of the breach less the contract 
price to the vendee. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 U2d 83, 
368 P2d 597 (Utah 1962 • 
The court in Bunnell further stated1 
Where a rule of law has been established for the 
measurement of damages, it must be followed by 
the finder of fact, and to recover damages plain-
tiff must prove not only that she has suffered a 
loss, but must also prove the extent and amount 
thereof. Furthermore, to warrant a recovery based 
on the value of the property there must be proof 
of its value or evidence of such facts as will 
warrant a finding of value with reasonable cer-
tainty. Bunnell v. Bills, supra. 
Arn Jur on damages states with regards to property attached 
to or forming a part of realtya 
The measure of damages for injuries for destruc-
tion of property attached to, or forming a part 
of, real· estate, and the admissibility of evidence 
to establish such damages, depends to some extent 
upon the character of the property taken or des-
troyed. If the property destroyed or injured is 
so closely connected with the land as to have little 
value separate from, and independent of the land, 
the measure of damages is the difference in value 
between the real estate before the injury and after 
it; the evidence to prove the amount of damages 
should relate to such difference in value rather 
than to the value of the property destroyed or 
injured. For example, testimony as to the value 
of shade trees is not admissible upon the question 
of damages for their destruction, since such damages 
-10-
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are measured in the depreciation of the value of 
the land. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, Sec. 326. 
Where there is direct and positive evidence of the 
present value of property, the mere cost thereof at some 
prior time is not controlling if of any weight whatever 
to sh01its present value. Crosby v. Anderson, 49 U 167, 
162 P75 (Utah 1916). And generally even offers to buy or 
sell real estate are not admissible to prove the value of 
property. 32 CJS Evidence, Sec. 182(3). Our jurisdiction's 
cases are numerous in stating that substantial evidence is 
required to support a finding (Bingham Coal and Lumber Coo 
vs. Board of Education of Jordan School District of Salt 
Lake County, 61 U 149, 211 P 981, Utah 1922) and that a 
finding of fact cannot be based on surmise, conjecture, guess, 
or speculation. Just a few additional citations area ~ 
Investment Co. vs. Carbon County Land Co., 7~U 76, 76 P2d 
616 (Utah 1938)J Higley vs. Industrial Commission, 75 U 361, 
285 p 306; Karren vs. Bair, 63 U 344, 225 P 1094; and ~ 
vs. warwood, 255 P2d 725 (Utah 1953). Nor can a finding be 
based on mere possibilities. Smith vs. Industrial Commission, 
104 u 318, 140 P2d 314. See also 32A CJS Evidence, Sec. 1042. 
The defendant has not sustained his burden of proof in 
this action sufficient to warrant the award of any damages 
for loss in market value due to removal of two compressors 
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from the store acquired from plaintiff, The trial court 
itself was concerned about any measure of damage (T67al7-22; 
T7l127), 
Any evidence bearing upon damage was certainly specUla-
ti ve. No clear or precise evidence was presented to show 
the market value had been reduced because two compressors 
were not present in the building. All that was shown was 
that $13,000.00 was allowed by Mr. Hemmert as a credit to' Mr. 
Stubbs for the grocery store building with fixtures attached 
(T7112). No personal property, the display cases and other 
items of movable grocery store equipmen~ were considered in 
the exchange, Then Mr. Hemmert sold the property to Mr. 
Jensen for $7,500.00 (T9130; 23125). Hemmert then states 
that he feels he could have sold the store together with 
personal equipment as a grocery store (Tll119). However, no 
offers to purchase the building for a grocery store or for a 
use to otherwise utilize the walk-in coolers was received 
(Tl6124-28). Jensen purchased the building at the price 
offered by the realtor (T2515-8); and Jensen would not have 
paid one cent more for the property if the compressors had 
been in the building (T25120-23). 
The testimony of the refrigeration man, Larry Hopkin 
(T43-44) was offered by plaintiff to impeach the allegations 
-12-
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of Hemmert who claimed damages in his complaint in the 
amount of over $5,000.00, and was not offered nor can it be 
accepted to prove the reduction in value of the realty, 22 
Am.Jur.2d Damages, Sec. 326, Supra. Mr. Hopkins testified 
that he examined two compressors. But the evidence dces not 
even establish the fact that these two compressors were in 
fact the two compressors present in the building when it was 
sold to Hemmert. 
The only other evidence which in any way could bear 
upon damage was the testimony of real estate agent Eugene 
Black Nhich is not before the court in the transcript and 
which defendant did not designate as further record on appeal. 
But the trial court's understanding of his testimony as being 
merely conjectural and speculative is clear in the transcript 
(T79119-21). 
No competent evidence of sufficient weight was produced 
at trial to in any way prove damage to market value and the 
finding of the trial court regarding $200.00 damage should be 
set aside. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SUBTANTIAL 
ERROR BY AWARDING DEFENDANT $200.00 DAMAGE FOR THE VALUE 
OF COMPRESSORS REMOVED FROM THE BUILDING CONTRARY TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY WHEN SAID COMPRESSORS HAD BEEN RE-
COVERED FROM THE THIRD PARTY WHO REMOVED THEM, TENDERED 
TO DEFENDANT, REJECTED BY DEFENDANT, AND RETURNED TO THE 
BUILDING FROM WHICH REMOVED. 
A fundamental maxim of equity is that equity seeks to 
do justice and avoid injustice. 30 CJS ECJ?ity, Sec. 891 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U2d 61, 362 P2d 427 (Utah 1961), 
Coinciding with this maxim is the principle that equality 
is equity. Rich v. Stephens, 79 U 411, 11 P2d 295 (Utah 1932), 
No greater injustice and inequity can result than to 
require plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of $200.00 for 
two compressors when plaintiff through his own efforts 
obtained return of two compressors to the grocery store in 
Santaquin. Equity will not suffer a double satisfaction to 
be taken nor unjust enrichment. 30 CJS Equity, Sec. 89, 
pg· 1059-1060. 
Once Mr. Henunert's complaint was known, plaintiff took 
it upon himself to obtain the compressors from Mr. Durrant, 
the person who had taken them from the grocery store (T341 
10129; 29119), Then plaintiff attempted to return said 
coolers to defendant (Tl719-24; 36119-25; 38115-20). But 
defendant rejected said compressors and claimed he had no 
use for them (T3918-20; 21122-27). 
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The testimony is not clear as to what plaintiff did 
with the compressors after Mr. Hemmert rejected them, but 
it may be inferred from the testimony of Mr. Hopkin (T42-44) 
indicating that he examined two compressors at the grocery 
store in Santaquin on July 27, 1976. And the purchaser of 
the store from defendant, Mr • .lmssen was to receive the two 
walk-in coolers with the purchase (T23a26-30, 2411-3). Plain-
tiff housed the compressors for several months in his own 
garage and then delivered them to the Santaquin store where 
Mr. Hopkin examined them. 
Equity cannot allow defendant to be paid for compressors 
returned to the store where they were to be. To rule other-
wise would be unjust enrichment and double recovery. Equity 
should step in and equalize the status of the parties. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SUBSTANTIAL 
ERROR BY AWARDING PLAINTIFF ONLY $150.00 FOR THE SERVICES 
OF HIS ATTORNEY. 
The most important point which plaintiff raises on 
his appeal is the inadequate award of attorney fees since 
the measure of fees granted is a tool of justice. Their 
inadequate or excessive taxation thwarts justice. 57 ALR3rd 
475, 2(a). 
Our code governs the award of attorney fees in fore-
closure actions as follows1 
In all cases of foreclosure when an attorney's 
fee is claimed by the plaintiff, the amount 
thereof shall be fixed by the court, any stipu-
lation to the contrary notwithstanding; provided 
no other or greater amount shall be allowed or 
decreed than the sum which shall appear by the 
evidence to be actually charged by and to be 
paid to the attorney for the plaintiff. If it 
shall appear that there is an agreement or 
understanding to divide such fees between the 
plaintiff and his attorney, or between the 
attorney and any other person except an attorney 
associated with him in the cause, only the amount 
to be retained by the attorney or attorneys shall 
be decreed as against the defendant. 78-37-9 
UCA 1953, as amended. 
There is general agreement not only that fees of attorneys 
should be adequate, but also that fees should be determined 
on the basis of a number of factors, no one of which should 
be controlling. 57 ALR3rd 475, 2(a). 
Both the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
-16-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah State Bar and the corresponding Disciplinary Rule of the 
code of professional conduct of the American Bar Association, 
DR2-106(b) sets forth many of the criteria layed down by the 
courts in the past as followsa 
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of 
the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be 
left with a definite and firm conviction that the 
fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to 
be considered as guides in determining the reason-









The time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal services 
properly. -
The likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employ-
ment will preclude other employment by the 
lawyer. 
The fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services. 
The amount involved and the results obtained. 
The time limitations imposed by the client 
or by the circumstances. 
The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client. 
The experience, reputation, and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services. 
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
DR2-106(B), RRBC Utah State Bar; Code of Professional 
Responsibility ABA. 
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In 1949 our court discussed the old Canon 12 from which 
the new disciplinary rule for our Bar and the ABA sterns. 
In counseling the State Industrial Commission on how to 
determine a reasonable fee they said in part1 
While ordinarily our power does not go beyond 
that of setting aside an order of the commission, 
in a case such as this we think it wise to advise 
the commission as to some of the factors which 
enter into the determination of a reasonable fee 
for legal work performed •••• The commission 
would not be arbitrary or unreasonable unless it 
fixed a fee which any reasonable mind, familiar 
with the value of attorneys' services would say 
was less than reasonable. That of course means 
that there must necessarily be a wide range because 
attorneys themselves vary widely as to the reason-
ableness of fees for professional work. And it 
must be kept in mind that here we are dealing with 
compensation benefits. Much could be said regard-
ing theanount of attorneys• fees. Lawyers perform 
differently according to their ability and experi-
ence. Sonework faster and more accurately and 
thoroughly than others. Each brings to his task 
his own capacity, expertness, ability, dispatch 
and experience. The author in a dissenting opin-
ion in the case of Ellis v. Industrial Commission, 
91 Utah 432, 64 P2d 363, dwelt at some length on 
these factors. It may be briefly said that an 
incompetent lawyer is apt to be a detriment to 
his client and is usually overpaid, whatever he 
receives, while a competent, well-trained, and 
skillful attorney may ofttimes be underpaid for 
the services he renders. 
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Utah State 
Bar, adopted May 28, 1936, approved by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah March 1, 1937, with 
amendments effective March 10, 1940, provides 
as follows1 
"In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges 
which overestimate their advice and services, 
as well as those which undervalue them. A client•s 
-18-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess 
of the v~lue of the service, though his poverty 
may require a less charge, or even none at all, 
The reasonable requests of brother lawyers and 
of their widows and orphans without ample ~eans 
should receive special and kindly consideration: 
"In determining the amount of the fee, it is 
proper to considers (1) the time and labor re-
quired, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved and the skill requisite properly to con-
duct the cause; (2) whether the acceptance of 
employment in the particular case will preclude 
the lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely 
to arise out of the transaction, and in which 
there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise 
he would be employed, or will involve the loss of 
other employment while employed in the particular 
case or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the 
customary charges of the Bar for similar services; 
(4) the amount involved in the controversy and for 
the benefits resulting to the client from the 
services; (5) the contingency or the certainty 
of the compensation; and (6) the character of the 
employment, whether casual or for an established 
and constant client. No one of these considera-
tions in itself is controlling. They are mere 
guides in ascertaining the real value of the service. 
"In determining the customary charges of the Bar 
for similar services, it is proper for a lawyer 
to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by 
a Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit him-
self to be controlled thereby or to follow it as 
his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee. 
"In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that 
the profession is a branch of the administration 
of justice and not a mere money-getting trade," 
It should be noted the above does not lay down a 
rule but presents guides for the fixing of attorneys' 
fees and so expressly states. , • • 
It would be the duty of the commission by evidence 
to fix a fee within the zone of reasonableness• The 
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commission would not ordinarily be required to 
determine from the evidence what would be the 
lower and upper limits of the zone for the 
services in any particular case. But it must 
be satisfied from evidence adduced as to the 
reasonable worth of the services rendered that 
the fee it fixes is within the zone. Thatcher 
vs. Industrial Commission, 207 P2d 178 (Utah 
1949). 
The amount of time and labor expended by the attorney 
is of major importance. American Law Reports states 
It appears to be universally agreed that the 
amount of time and labor expended by the attorney 
on behalf of his client is, in general, one of 
the most important factors, if not the most 
important factor, considered by the courts in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee 
in a particular case •• • • 57 ALR3rd 475, 2(a). 
But the real test is the value of the services performed 
by the attorney for his client. The Supreme Court of Kansas 
has said on this points 
The real test in the allowance of attorney fees 
is the value of the services performed by the 
attorney on behalf of his client; and the court 
in determining the amount thereof may consider 
labor, time and trouble involved, as well as the 
extent of services rendered and the nature and 
importance of the litigation; also the responsi-
bility imposed on such counsel; the amount of 
money involved; the skill and experience called 
for in the performance of the services; the 
professional character and the standing of the 
attorney; and the results secured. Attebery vs. 
MFA Mutual Insurance Com an , 191 Kan. 178, 388 
P2d 647 Kan. 1963 • 
Applying the value of service test in the above case, 
the Kansas court rejected the contention that the amount in 
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controversy should control the fee awarded and granted attorneys' 
fees of $400.00 in an action to recover the value of an auto-
mobile under collision coverage where verdict for plaintiff 
was only $300.00 and insurer tendered $272.50. Attebery v. 
MFA Mutual, Supra. 
Our own court found $1,056.00 not excessive attorney 
fees in successfully foreclosing a $6,068.00 mortgage where 
the defendant set up as a defense a breach of a separate con-
tract and a counterclaim for specific performance. Wallace v. 
Build, Inc., 16 U2d 401, 402 P2d 699 (Utah 1965). And our 
court has also felt that an attorney fee of $2,500.00 is 
not unreasonable in a sununary judgment on a trust deed secur-
ing a note of $27,500.00 where the time and amount of work 
was taken in evidence. Security Title Company vs. Pay Less 
Builders' Supply, 17 U2d 179, 407 P2d 141 (Utah 1965). 
In addition to the foregoing criteria, Bar Association 
suggested fee schedules, charges in the same locality, and cur-
rent inflationary trends and cost of living are all persuasive 
evidence of what constitutes a reasonable fee. 57 ALR3rd 
475; 58 ALR3rd 201; 7 CJS Attorney and Client, Sec. 191(2). 
Further, our Utah court as early as 1915 had this to 
say about what constitutes a reasonable fees 
By a 'reasonable fee,' no doubt, is meant one which 
is reasonable under all the facts and circumstances 
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~f each case, What is reasonable, therefore, 
in a large measure at least, must depend upon 
the amount in controversyp the labor, and 
responsibility imposed upon the attorney in 
obtaining judgment, as these things may have 
arisen from the issues presented and tried, 
If an attorney is required to do no more than 
to prepare the formal pleadings and decree in 
a default case, a smaller sum, no doubt, would 
be reasonable, than in a contested case, and 
especially in one where the issues were numer-
ous and where intricate questions of both fact 
and law arose and had to be determined. Jensen vs. 
Lichtenstein, 45 U 320, 145 P 1036 (Utah 1915), 
enphasis added. 
Then, we also feel as a tool of justice for all concerned, 
the adequacy of the fees should always be considered where 
allowed for to insure the aggrieved will obtain adequate 
representation. We agree with the learned justices in 
the Thatcher v. Industrial Commission case, supra, when 
they adviseds 
While attorneys may not hope to be compensated 
to the full measure of the value of their time 
and work, they must not be limited to such 
niggardly fees that they cannot afford to accept 
compensation cases. And particularly where it 
has become necessary to carry a compensation 
case to this court should the commission be at 
least moderately liberal in allowance of attorneys' 
fees. Better that an applicant should lose 15% 
to 20% of his benefits in attorneys' fees than 
that he should receive no benefits at all merely 
because no lawyer could afford or would be will-
ing to accept his case and properly present it 
to the commission and the courts, for the main 
reason that the compensation for such services 
would be grossly inadequate. Thatcher v. Indus-
trial Commission, supra. 
See also R22 for plaintiff's additional analysis. 
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Justice Wade in his concurring opinion in Thatcher 
also saids 
I do not believe that the legislature intended 
this kind of work to be done without compensa-
tion or for unreasonable low compensation. If 
we adhere to the rule that such compensation may 
be so fixed then many cases will have to be liti-
gated without the benefit of legal counsel and 
many a deserving person who is entitled to compen-
sation. will be barred therefrom ••• and the appli-
cant will not be fortunate enough to contact a law-
yer who would take his case, knowing that he would 
not be adequately compensated for his services. 
The attorneys' fees should therefore be fixed with-
in the bounds of reasonable compensation for the 
services rendered anp should be sufficient in 
that the average lawyer can afford to take that 
kind of case without losing money by such employ-
ment. Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
Even chief Justice Pratt dissenting in Thatcher said: 
It is human nature to shy away from the arbitrary 
control of others, and attorneys are no exception. 
Met with a law in which the layman is given such 
unbridled control of his fees, the attorney where 
arbitrariness is less apt to follow. Who suffers 
as a result? The applicant before the commission, 
as he (or she, as in this case) is handicapped in 
acquiring justice. He either must accept inferior 
service, or must fight his battle alone against 
astute well paid counsel of--in many instances--
his corporate employer. Thatcher v. Industrial 
Conunission, supra. 
We do not feel the trial court followed the above princi-
ples in its award of attorney fees. See R22 and Rl4o 
The applicable contractual provision of the mortgage note 
(Exhibit "A" of complaint; RlOO; Al) states& 
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If this note is placed with an attorney for 
collection, or if suit be instituted for col-
lection, then in either event, the undersigned 
agrees to pay reasonable attorneys' fees. 
(Emphasis added) 
The applicable contractual provision of the mortgage 
securing said note (Exhibit "B" of Complaint, RlOO; A2) 
statess 
The mortgagors agree to pay all taxes and asses-
smen7s on said.pr~mises, and a reasonable attorney's 
ief: in case suit is brought to collect the debt 
hereby secured, which fee is secured hereby. • • 
(Emphasis added) 
The last published Central Utah Bar Association minimum 
fee schedule of 1969 (A3) and the Advisory Schedule of Mini-
mum Fees of the Utah State Bar last published in March 1969 
(A4) both suggest $500.00 as a minimum fee for foreclosure 
of mortgages on real property. The suggested minimum fee 
for appearance in any district court for any reason is the 
sum of $150.00, and minimum fee for pre-trial conferences 
$100.00. Said schedules also provide a suggested percentage 
fee for default foreclosures of $50.00 of the first $100,00 
recovered, one-third of the next $400.00 recovered, and 25% 
of the next $500.00 recovered in no contest situations. 
A recent Utah State Bar letter reported average hourly 
attorney fees to be $53.00 per hour in early 1974 (AS). 
The usual and ordinary minimum fee charged by attorneys in 
Provo for office work and court work is $35.00 per hour (T5712·1: 
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and in the Salt Lake area $47.00 to $52.00 an hour (T57a2-4). 
Cost of living for attorneys as well as any other member 
of society have appreciated considerably. The inflationary 
rate evidenced by the Consumer Price Index indicates 80.3 on 
the index in 1956 and 156.5 for the present• There has 
been over a 10(],l(, increase in the cost of living since 1956. 
Of major importance is the time expended and labor per-
formed by counsel on behalf of plaintiff. The following amounts 
of time expended were testified to by plaintiff's counsels 
4 1/8 hours negotiating prior to suit for return 
of compressors by Durrant and settlement (T55al8) 
3 3/8 hours preparation of Complaint, Lis Pendens, 
and further negotiation with Attorney Dorius and 
Hemmert regarding possible settlement (T55a28) 
6 3/8 hours responding to Counterclaim, prepar-
ing Interrogatories to defendant, and attempting 
to obtain answers to Interrogatories (T56a2) 
3 1/4 hours preparing and appearing on Motion to 
Dismiss (T5615) 
6 1/2 hours further discovery after receiving 
answers from Attorney Dorius pursuant to court's 
order of August 22 (T56al0) 
6 3/8 hours pre-trial preparation from time court 
sent notice of pre-trial and including pre-trial 
conference and negotiations regarding settlement 
(T56113) 
3 7/8 hours trial preparation (T56al7) 
Totals 33 7/8 hours. 
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An examination of the pleadings prepared and filed 
in this action shows further the labor expended on behalf 
of plaintiff by plaintiff's counsel including Complaint, 
Lis Pendens, Summons, Reply to Counterclaim, Interrogatories 
to Defendant, Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements, Motion 
for Default Judgment and Dismissal, Notice of Readiness, 
and the final Findings, Conclusions, and Foreclosure Decree 
and Judgment. Since the Judgment was entered, plaintiff's 
counsel has further moved the court to amend Findings and 
Judgment and prepared the Statement of Points and Authorities 
in support of said Motion and reply Points to defendant's 
objections. 
The record also reflects in defendant's Answer and 
Counterclaim (R96) an affirmative defense of release of 
mortgage. The mortgage and note in this action was ambiguous 
and the defense raised by defendant required plaintiff's 
counsel to prepare detailed interrogatories, prod for 
their answer, examine the law, and interview officers at 
First Security Bank in Payson in preparation for trial. 
It was only at pre-trial and after this exhaustive prepara-
tion that plaintiff was able to obtain admission from defen-
dant to the continuing genuineness of the mortgage lien. 
Further testimony establishing attorney fees (T52155-57) 
establishes the expertise and qualifications of counsel, and 
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the fee of $600.00 to be charged plaintiff for the foreclosure. 
None of this testimony establishing a reasonable attorney fee 
was contradicted by testimony presented by defendant. Morri-
son v. Federico, 232 P2d 374, 379 (Utah 1951). 
If the award of $150.00 attorney fees to plaintiff herein 
is allowed to stand, in effect if you suttract the 3 1/4 hours 
spent by plaintiff's counsel in preparing his original Motion 
to Dismiss for failure to file proper answers to interrogatories 
and disregard any time spent since trial in preparing Findings, 
Conclusions, and Decree and Judgment, etc., plaintiff's counsel 
has been working for $5.00 per hour for 30 hours and even if 
you cut that in half, plaintiff's counsel has been working for 
only $10.00 per hour for 15 hours. 
Taking the figure of 30 hours billable time per week at 
$150.00, an attorney would gross about $600.00 per month since 
there is a recognizable amount of nonbillable time each week 
for indigents, etc. That would not even pay his office rental 
and secretarial expenses. An attorney has a responsibility 
to society. But an attorney must also sustain himself. 
Even if the amount of time testified to by plaintiff's 
counsel is divided in half, taking $150.00 for 15 hours of 
work, an attorney would gross approximately $1,200.00 per month. 
Today subtracting all overhead expenses, he would end UP with 
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an income of approximately $200.00 a month. Reasonable? 
If the rule is established that a defendant who brings 
a counter complaint and proves a right to recover under 
said counter complaint, no matter how small, is allowed 
to interfere with the amount of fees awarded plaintiff 
on his complaint, inj~tice will resulto The argument 
regarding this point on pages 3 & 4 of plaintiff's State-
ment of Points and Authorities (Rl4) is pertinent. 
The mortgage note (Exhibit "A" of Complaint, RlOO; Al) 
provides for attorney fees both before and after suit. There-
fore, the fees awarded plaintiff should encompass services 
rendered by his counsel in collecting the note and foreclos-
ing the mortgage prior to commencement of suit as well as 
after. The Florida District Court of Appeal recently held 
that where an attorney for the prevailing party spent 44 
hours on a case, $500.00 attorney fees awarded was an abuse 
of discretion and the award was increased to $1,500.00. 
Flagala Corporation vs. Hamm, 302 So2d 195 (Fla. 1974). 
Plaintiff also feels the trial court abused its discretion 
and plaintiff should be awarded increased attorney feeso 
Plaintiff further requests the court to award him a 
reasonable attorney fee for bringing this appeal. Our court 
has held that said attorney fees on appeal are discretionary. 
State vs. Shonka, 3 U2d 121, 279 P2d 709 (Utah 1955). 
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In neighboring jurisdictions of Arizona and California they deemed 
them allowable on appeal. Amos Flight Operations, Inc. vs. 
Thunderbird Bank, 540 P2d 1244 (Arizona 1975); San Luis Obispo 
Bay Properties, Inc. vs. Pacific Gas and Electric Company. 104 
cal.Rptr. 733, 28 Cal App. 3rd 556 (Cal. 1972). Plaintiff 
therefore respectfully requests an appropriate fee award on 
this appeal, and a more respectable fee for the foreclosure 
action from the time counsel was first retained through entry 
of findings and decree. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Warranty Deed delivered to defendant by plaintiff 
merged the earnest money receipt and defendant should not 
recover damages from plaintiff except upon theories of 
negligence, unlawful conversion, or some other tort. More-
over, there is not sufficient evidence as a reasonable basis 
for the award of damages and even if there was, equity cannot 
allow defendant to recover twice or for plaintiff to pay 
twice after he obtained the compressors which were taken 
by Mr. Durrant, attempted to return them to the store in 
Santaquin, had them rejected by defendant and later returned 
them to the store to the new owner. 
Attorney fees are a tool of justice. The court should 
have awarded more adequate fees to plaintiff for his attorneys. 
THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF PRAYS that the $200.00 damages 
plus interest awarded defendant be stricken and that he be 
awarded additional and more adequate attorney fees together 
with attorney fees for this appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
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$ 4, jOO. 00 .................................... R~.~9.~····-·········· Utah - Feb~ 20 · 19 71:;. ~ · 
-·- --- -··- ·-·---- - . - - . - . - --- - - - . - -~ ~~~:·1~:~-.:~~::={~·~~ 
FOR v AL UE RECEIVED, the undersigned severally _pi:_:cim~ to pay _to FIRST SECURITY i3ANI{°'.:~~-_ 
OF UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, or_ order, the pnncipal_~~~f~,~-:_:~~;--~:::=__.:S~~;.'.: 
__ 1:_()rtT.'1.'£l!t'._e __ ~~~~-~--~~ .. 9.i?.l_~~ ... : .. _: .. :.: .. L.: ... ~ .... ~ ... .:_ .. :.::~-'.::::_ .. DQLLARS. ($~1..2~:00~.::j:.".~.:._ 
with interest from .... .::.. .. - ... F~lm.\~ ... ?.Q ................. , 19.TI. .. , at the rate of ..... §.,_l.::::.:: ... perccntperann;un'.'~ 
on the unpaid principal balanffi.g:ii}l. 'W]..~· ,+'h~t'1~t.c< is .J!al[able in ls,wful~money of the United.::=--·-
States of America to the/fl~~ SEtlJlt~~R: 5ritJ-fXH;~'ffb1NAL ASSOCIATION-iit ib-~~ 
__ .feyJ?_QfL. ... -.. : ........ -··--···- Branch in ... -····:·--···--.:. .... I'.e;Y.Jil.OD.=..::::.=::::::.:~_:., Utah,· or ~t -s~ch:;~:-
other place as the legal holder hereof may designate in writing, deliver~ }>r:. mailed to the debtOr -:hr ;::;: . ~~~-~~:r;~~-1-~~~~:i;~:~~~:~~~:00Jiw=:~:::;.:=~::;:~~:::;.:~:.::·~:::=~~~:::~-~~~;.<~::~~t.f~=1~~-
•ach commencing on the ay of -···---·-··-··-··-··--~_g}'L .......... : ........ , 19.1.l .. , and continuing on theJClmt 
day ~f each month thereafter until .paid._ ...... ::·:: ..... ~ ...... - ......... ~ .. >.,~:~.:.~''""~~~: 
Delinquent installments, including interest, shall bear interest-~t-~~ r~t~ ofeig~t--~ c~t p~;~~~:::~:~· 
from the date of delinquency until paid. · · · · · - . - ..:..~:' '~ 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest,-~~d-~-:~~cc:if-any, shall be appli~:~~-~:/-
the principal. _- __ :;:-=~~~~::: :. -> _:_ ·_ :~~~-;:: 
In case of default in payment of any of said installments of principal--~d interest;,;. any part ther~ · ·· ~­
of, it shall be optional with the legal holder of this note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and · 
payable, and proceedings may at once be instituted for the enforcement and collection of the same by law. 
lf thjs gate js placed with an attorney for collection, or if suit be instituted for collection, then in either 
event, the unoersigned agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof sev~rally waive presentment for payment, pro· 
test, notice of protest and of non-payment of this note, and consent that this note and any payment due 
or to become clue hereunder may be extended or renewed without previous d~1111d or notice. 
This note is to be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
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-~----~~-----------APPENDIX 2 
All of which sums the mortgagors agree to repay, on demand when not otherwis d 
shall well and truly pay each and all of the sums of indebtedness herein s ecified i~ "}ree ' and l!. the said me 
then .these presents and everything herein contained shall be void anythi~g here'm co~~~f~:~c~ ":_t,th the te11r; 
standing; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue. ' 0 e contrary:' 
The lien of this mortgage shall remain in full force and effect during any postponement or e t · 
ant by the mortgagors to be perfonned or of the time of payment of the indebtedness or any pa t txh ensi1on of •r: r ereo secure~ 
. The mortgagors shall not commit or pennit waste; shall make no structural alterations in said m t · 
without the pnor. wntten consent of the mortgagee; shall obey and observe all laws, ordinances, gov~~;aged.; 
t1ons, and. restrictive cov~nants pertaining to the use and occupancy of said mortgaged property· and shalfenk 
property in as good condition as at present, reasonable wear and tear excepted, and upon any 'failure so matt. 
mortgagee, at its option, may cause reasonable maintenance work to be performed at the cost of the mortg~og~ 
all taxe a · 
ep s t premises ree r 
responsible fire insurance t· 
satisfactory to said mortgagee, its successors or assigns, for the sum of $ ···-----·····----------- until said debt is luiln 
insurance policy to be de!Jvered to and to be made payable to said mortga1:ee, its successors or assigns whc: 
powered to collect the same and apply the proceeds on said note. If said mortgagors fail to maintain such ins··\ 
to pay such taxes and assessments when due, or to keep off mechanic's liens, then said mortgagee, its succeSS::· 
signs may at its oph_on, declare said note and mortgage immediately due and payable, and proceed by law toi 
this mortgage, or said mortgagee, its successors or assigns, may, if it so elects, pay said taxes, assessments' 
costs of insurance; and the. amount so J?ald, together with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent per,,,;.: 
be secured hereby, and notice of mtent1on to exercise such option or election is hereby waived. ' 
If said property is leff vacant, said mortgagee, its successors or assigns, is authorized to occupy the same 
the insurance valid and prevent damage to the property. 
The recording and satisfaction of this mortgage shall be at the cost of said mortgagors. 
If the mortgagors, or either of them shall be adjudged bankrupt or make assignment of his, her or their. 
or any part thereof, for the benefit of creditors, or if any portion of the mortgaged premises shall be att: 
levied upon in any suit against the mortgagors or either of them, then in either of such events the holder h" 
declare the whole indebtedness due and payable and immediately foreclose this mortgage. 
If the mortgagors default in any of the payments or covenants contained in this mortgage to be performedt 
or if any warranty made by them be broken, then, without notice to the mortgagors, the whole sum secur<i' 
shall at the option of the holder hereof, immediately become due and rayable. This mortgage shall cover and inc 
crops, rents, issues and profits from the said mortgaged premises from and after such default, both before andr 
commencement of foreclosure proceedings. In case of foreclosure the court, upon filing of the complaint, on 1e 
the plaintiff and without notice to the mortgagors, or either of them, and without regard to the solvency or bm 
of the mortgagors or either of them, and regardless of the nnture of the property or the value thereof or Iii! 
which the same may be applied, shall appoint a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and•-
crops, rents, issues and profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the debt secured hereby, or hold~ 
pursuant to the order of the court; and the holder, upon entry oi judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the~; 
of the mortgaged premises during the period of redemption, &nd th~ judgment shall provide for such possess10no 
issuance of the necessary process of court to carry out such provision of the judgment. Each and all of the remed! 
to the mortgagee by this mortgage shall be deemed additional and cumulative, and not exclusive. If any provilio: 
mortgage shall be held void, the same shall not affect any other provision hereof. 
Whenever used, the singular number shall include the plural, the plural the singular, the use of any geol 
be applicable to all genders, and the term "mortgagee" shall include any payee of the indebtedness hereby securr. 
transferee thereof whether by operation of law or otherwise. 
The said mortgagors covenant and agree to pay any and all taxes and assessm.en.ts that may be levied~· 
mortgage or the debt hereby secured by reason of any State or Federal Law now existing or which may herti 
enacted. 
WITNESS, the hands of said mortgagors this 
at ··-----··--···--·--·-··-··-·----·-·-·-··-- ___ l'ayson. 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: 
--------------------------
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
··--·-·---·--·A.O., 19 .. 71, ___ , personally appeared v" 
~.- / :( ___ . 
N<)t,iry 1'•'~, 1 ': 
• J 
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Contracts, sale or purdi:'"-' "[real or personal property or 
both --------------------------------------------------------------- $ Conditional Sales of Personal Property ___________ :::·-----------------------$ 
Power of Attorney -------------------------------------------------------------------------$ 
Bulle ?ales Transfers, including affidavit, cont~~~t--~f---~i~; 
assignment of lease and other necessary documents $ Certi~icate Doing ~~sin~s under Assumed Name ....... :::::::::::::$ 
Drawmg of Mecharuc s Lien (if description is furnished) $ 
Income Tax Returns, State and Federal, Farmers and B~~~~-
Men -------------------------------------------------------------------------- $ 
Income Tax Returns, State and Federal, wages only::::::::::::::::$ 
Esc~ow Agree!ilents, including deed, etc ..................................... $ 
Notices to Qwt ···············------------------······----------------·························$ 
VII. CHA'ITEL MORTGAGES 
Foreclosure by non-judicial process, including all other sales 
not under judicial process ....................................................... $ 
VIII. COLLECTIONS AND FORECLOSURES 
Notes and Contracts Providing for the Payment of Reasonable 
Attorneys Fees Where There Is No Mortgage or Lien 
Security: 
(a) Unsecured 
Amount of principal Amount of fee Total 
and interest Per cent on portion judgment 














The first __________ $ 100 50% $ 50.00 $ 100 $ 50.00 
The next -------- 400 331,3% 133.33 500 1&3.33 
The next -------- 500, 25% 125.00 1,000 308.33 The next ________ 1,000 20% 200.00 2,000 508.33 
The next -------- 8,000 15% 1,200.00 10,000 1,708.33 
' 
All over ---------- 10,000 10% C· Notes, Mortgages and Contracts that A:re Supported By a 
Mortgage or Lien. 
(b) Secured 
The first ________ $ 100 50% $ 50.00 $ 100 $ 50.00 
The next -------- 400 33'f.i% 133.33 500 183.33 
The next -------- 500 25~ 125.00 1,000 308.33 
The next -------- 1,000 15 0 150.00 2,000 458.00 
The next -------- 18,000 10% 1,800.00 20,000 2,258.~3 Above ______________ 20,000 no set fee 
NOTE: It is recognized that a fee in foreclosures of Mortgages may be on a ~on­
contingent or guaranteed fee basis. and the usual factors of amount and-~ 
involved. and complexities, retainers, etc., may be considered in detenDllllDg 
a reasonable fee. 
Minmium Fee for Foreclosure of Mortgage on Real Property .... $ 500.00 
( c) Trust Deeds 
Foreclosure of Trust Deed by Exercise of Power of Sale as Provided 
for Under Trust Deed Act Enacted by 1961 Legislature. 
1. Full fee, if foreclosure proceeds to Trustee's Sale and Deed. 
Amount of 
Unpaid Principal Amount of 
Advances and Fee on Such 
Accrued Interest Percent for Fee Percentage Total Fees 
The first __ ________ $ 1,000 673% $ 66.66 $ 66.66 ( Min.-$66.66) 
206.66 The next 7,000 2% 140.00 
The next __ 42,000 l'f.!% 560.00 766.66 
The next 50,000 73of1% 333.32 1,099.9P 
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APPENDIX 4 
.' ·:·E :>ISTR!C':' (';; l; ltTS 
CIVIL A:\'D CRIMINAL Dl\'ISIONS 
a. Appearance for either party __________ _ 
---------------- -----------·--------$150.00 
b. Motions ------------------------------------------------------------- ______________________ _ 75.00 
c. Per diem for conducting trial ---------------·-------------------------------------------- 200.00 
d. Pretrial Conferences ------------------------------ __________ -------------------------------- 100.00 
e. Minimum Retainer (to be credited against total fee) ---------------------- 250.00 
The following schedule of attorneys' fees has been adopted by the 
Third Judicial District Court as of December 1, 1959, in default cases 
presented without proof as to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees in 
actions for the collection of money: 
(Notes and Contracts Providing for the Payment of Reasonable Attorneys 
Fees Where There Is No Mortgage or Lien Security) 
(a) unsecured 
Amount of Amounr Total 
principal ,., cent of fee ludgmenl Total 
and lntere1I for fee on portion, without , ... 
on lvdgment of recovery ,_ 
The first $ 100. 50% $ 50.00 $ 100. $ 50.00 
The next 400. 331h% 133.00 500. 183.33 
The next 500. 25% 125.00 1,000. 308.33 
The next 1,000. 20% 200.00 2,000. 508.33 
The next 8,000. 15% 1,200.00 10,000. 1,708.33 
All over 10,000. 10% 
(Notes, Mortgages and Contracts That Are Supported 
By a Mortgage or Lien.) 
(b) secured 
The first $ 100. 50% $ 50.00 $ 100. $ 50.00 
The next 400. 331h% 133.00 500. 183.33 
The next 500. 25% 125.00 1,000. 308.33 
The next 1,000. 15% 150.00 2 000. 458.00 
The next 18,000. 10% 1,800.00 20,000. 2,258.33 
Above 20,000. no fee is set 
NOTE: It is recognized that a fee in foreclosures of Mortgages may ~e on a ooo-
contingent on guaranteed fee basis, and the usual fa~t<?rs of amount and time Involved, 
and complexities, etc., may be considered In determining a reasonable fee. 
Minimum Fee for Foreclosure of Mortgage on Real Property .................................... $500.00 
f. Quieting Title ----------------------------------------------------··-·------·-------------·: .......... $250.00 
g. Terminate Life Estate 
With Court Action ------------------------------·----------------------------------------- 100.00 
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TJt h ar 'ff 
"Grandpa, tell me again about the good old days before 'No-Fault'." 
Reprinted with permission from Erie 
County (New York) Bar Association 
Bulletin. 
U.S. SUPREME COURT AUTOMATING 
The Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of 
the United States, is at present experimenting 
with automation. Much of the material in the 
office will be reduced .to machine-readable 
form and as part of the project all accredit-
ed attorneys will be listed on machine-read-
able tape. All attorneys who are members of 
the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United 
States are asked therefore to fill out the 
following form and return it to the Clerk, 
Supreme Court of the United States, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20543, and mark it for the atten-
tion of BAR PROJ. 
NAME _________ DATE ADMITTED ____ _ 
BUSINESS ADDRESS: 
----------------
Street. ____________________ _ 
City & State -------------~~---ip 
RESIDENCE ADDRESS: Street __________ _ 
City ~ State -------------~~---lp 
SOCL\L SECUHI rY ACCOUNT NUMBER --------~ 
IAWYERS I FEES CN UPSWING 
The typical hourly rates charged by select-
ed law firms in most parts of the United 
States and in Canada rose sharply between 
early 1973 and early 1974. 
The 1974 Survey of Law Firm Economics, 
conducted by the consulting organization 
of Altman & Weil, Inc., shows that median 
hourly rates went up in all regions except 
the Midwestern States. The hourly charge 
rates reported by 181 law firms for law-
yers with six to ten years of experience 
were: 
Early Early 
Area 1973 .J.974 
Canada 1'.1 $45 $55 
\iil~~tlluiig n i j~ ~~ 
Midwestern U.S. 45 45 
southwestern U.S. 40 46 
Northeastern U.S. so 52 
Southern U.S. 45 53 
The average fee charged by these firms for 
formation of a busine~s corporation with 
$100,000 capital ranges from a low $419 
in the Southwestern United States to a 
high of $530 average in the Western States. 
Canadian firms charge an average of $480. 
The range of reported charges for this 
service is from under $250 to more than 
$1,000. 
Average per diem rates 
Court were reported in 
for Federal Distric~j: 







Sou-chern U. S. 
Early Early :l 
1973 1974 11 





The survey provides similar information 
for a number of other specific legal ser-
vices, including legal matters in real 
estate, estate planning, pensions, pro-
fessional corporations and SEC practice. 
The 1974 survey of Law Firm Ecomonics is 
an annual service of Altman & Weil, Ina., 
a management consulting firm which spe-
cializes in the problems of lawyers. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed 2 copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to Mr. Dale M. Dorius, Attorney at Law, P.- o. Box 165, 
Brigham City, Utah 
_\JQ_ ..... u__ ~/y'f\........_R ......... >JA _______ , 1976. 
84032, on this \ Q,:bh day of 
-36-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
